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COMMENTS
SCOPE OF PROTECTION ACCORDED CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEES UNDER THE NLRA
Confidential employees are not expressly excludedfrom the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Recognizing the incongruity of re-
quiring employers to bargain collectively with confidential
employees, the National Labor Relations Board has developed a
test thatprohibits certain employees from becoming members of
units comprised of other clerical workers. However, the Board
and the courts disagree over whether those confidential employ-
ees satidfying the test are excluded only from becoming mem-
bers of a particular unit or from the Act in toto. This comment
examines this clash of views and suggests that confidential em-
ployees should be excludedfrom all provisions of the Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
The nation's workplace is in the midst of a transition from one that
was traditionally comprised of blue collar workers to one that encom-
passes a larger number of gray' and white collar employees.2 Ac-
knowledging this recent trend, labor unions have begun to direct their
efforts towards the organization of the gray and white collar sector into
their rank and file.3 Although organized labor readily accepts this
challenge, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)4 imposes numer-
1. The term "gray collar" refers to those employed in service industries. See AFL-
CIO, A Short History of American Labor, Am. FEDERATIONIST (Mar. 1981).
2. The past two decades have illustrated a significant technological employment
transfer. As a total percentage of the Nation's workforce, blue collar employment
has decreased by 4.9 percent, whereas white collar employment has increased by
8.8 percent over the same period. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1981 401 (102d ed. 1981). Within the white
collar sector, The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of
Labor has projected that clerical workers will "constitute the largest and fastest
growing white-collar group" generating an additional 4.8 million jobs. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MORE THAN HALF OF NEW JOBS
BY 1990 WILL BE IN WHITE-COLLAR OCCUPATIONS, USDL 79-903 (1979).
3. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES INTERNA-
TIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, art. II, 1-2 (Purposes and Aims) (1980) (available from
Labor-Management Services Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Washington, D.C.
20216); CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED ASSOCIATION OF OFFICE, SALES AND
TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES, art. II (Purposes), art. III (Membership) (1976) (avail-
able from Labor-Management Services Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20216); see also Vogel, Your Clerical Workers are Ripefor Unionization,
49 H Rv. BUS. REv., 48-54 (Mar. 1971) (pointing out that sects of office workers
as large as those employed on production lines, and whose work is just as routine,
have emerged and are as far removed from management as their blue collar coun-
terparts); Unions Move Into the Office, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 25, 1982 at 90.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976). The Wagner Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley
Act, constitutes the Labor-Management Relations Act which is commonly re-
ferred to as the National Labor Relations Act.
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ous obstacles to the unionization of many of these occupations.
A significant amount of controversy has arisen in regard to the
amount of protection an employee is furnished under the NLRA. In
particular, it is uncertain whether some occupations are implicitly fore-
closed from either all or part of the NLRA's guarantees. Since confi-
dential employees, especially those in clerical positions proximate to
management, are not expressly excluded from the NLRA's protections,
these positions clearly fall within the parameters of this ambiguous
classification.
To exacerbate matters, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB)5 maintains that while certain confidential employees are ex-
cluded from sections of the NLRA that pertain to collective bargaining,
they are, nonetheless, accorded basic protections under other signifi-
cant provisions.6 However, the NLRB's position on the protections ac-
corded confidential employees under the NLRA is in conflict with the
federal courts of appeals that have squarely addressed the issue.7
The NLRB has developed a labor-nexus test in an effort to deline-
ate those confidential employees implicitly exempt from inclusion in a
bargaining unit. The labor-nexus test, recently approved by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Member-
shi Corp., I excludes from the collective bargaining unit confidential
employees "who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who
formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field
of labor relations."9 This comment examines the way in which both
the NLRB and the courts apply the labor-nexus test. Also discussed is
the conflict between the NLRB and the circuit courts as to whether
employees who meet the test are excluded only from the collective bar-
gaining unit or from the NLRA in toto.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Labor Law
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was the first federal statute to recog-
nize the rights of employees to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining.1l The statute limits the power of the
5. The NLRB is the federal agency statutorily charged with administration of the
NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Peerless of America, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 982, 987 (1972); enforcement de-
nied, 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973); Wheeling Electric Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 218, 220-
21 (1970), enforcement denied, 444 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971); American Book-
Stratford Press, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 914, 919 (1948).
7. See, e.g., Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973); NLRB
v. Wheeling Electric Co., 444 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971).
8. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
9. Id at 188 (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956)).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). Section 102 states that the public policy of the
United States in regard to collective bargaining is as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid
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federal courts to issue injunctions against union activity in disputes that
arise in the field of labor relations." Since many state legislatures fol-
lowed suit and enacted similar statutes,' 2 it soon became difficult for
employers to obtain injunctive relief - which placed labor unions in a
relatively favorable position.' 3
To further promote collective bargaining between labor and man-
agement, Congress enacted the Wagner Act based on the finding that
industrial strife significantly burdened the free flow of interstate com-
merce.14 The Wagner Act provided for the creation of the NLRB and
enumerated specific employer practices as unfair. 5 As a result of these
protections, union membership rose dramatically in both strength and
of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the cor-
porate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unor-
ganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of
contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain ac-
ceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he
should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that
he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and condi-
tions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
ll. Id. § 104.
12. Twenty-eight states currently have either constitutional or statutory provisions
limiting a court's jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes. 1 LAB. L. REP.
State Laws 40,356 (1981); see, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, §§ 63-75 (1979 &
Supp. 1983): OR. REV. STAT. §§ 662.010-.130 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206
(Purdon 1982).
13. Prior to passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, employers often successfully en-
joined union activities by alleging that the concerted efforts amounted to a crimi-
nal conspiracy. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Gunter, 169 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
Alternatively, the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), which out-
lawed "[elvery ... conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral states" provided additional relief to employers to combat concerted union
activity.
14. See Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The act declared:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have
the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce
by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentali-
ties of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materi-
ally affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or
manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of com-
merce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (d) caus-
ing diminution of employment and wages in such volume as
substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or
into the channels of commerce.
Id (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976) (creation of NLRB); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976) (em-
ployer unfair labor practices).
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Although the Wagner Act proved beneficial to the collective bar-
gaining process, employers and employees were still unprotected
against certain union abuses.17 In addition, the general public was left
unprotected against work stoppages caused by labor disputes.'" The
Supreme Court highlighted the need for these protections in Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB ' 9 wherein the court recognized the inadequa-
cies of the Act and stressed that it was for Congress, and not the court,
to create a more balanced national labor policy.20 In addition, Packard
addressed the issue of whether foremen were included within the Wag-
ner Act's definition of "employees" entitled to collective bargaining
rights.2 The Court rejected the company's contention that foremen are
so closely aligned to management that they should not be considered
"employees" for purposes of the Act.22 Furthermore, the Court de-
clined to accept the argument that pursuant to the definition of "em-
ployers" foremen acted in the employer's interest.23 Instead, the
Supreme Court strictly construed the Wagner Act's provisions defining
"employees" and "employers" and concluded that foremen fell within
the scope of "employees."24 As later noted by Congress, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Wagner Act in Packard had the potential
to place all upper level management personnel within the scope of
"employees" for purposes of collective bargaining.25
16. By 1950 approximately 15 million workers were members of labor organizations
as compared to 3 million in 1933. B. TAYLOR & F. WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS
LAW 7-8 (2d ed. 1975).
17. The Wagner Act was devoid of outlining any union activity as unfair.
18. In the Wagner Act's subsequent amendment, Congress indicated the inadequacies
of the Act when it stated:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some la-
bor organizations, their officers and members have the intent or the nec-
essary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the
free flow of goods in such commerce through strikes and other forms of
industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair the inter-
est of the public in the free flow of such commerce. The elimination of
such practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights
herein guaranteed.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (Taft-Hartley Act).
19. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
20. Id at 489-90.
21. Id at 486.
22. Id at 488-89.
23. Id at 489-90.
24. Id at 490.
25. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947). The House Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor summarized the congressional disfavor of the decision as follows:
The evidence before the committee shows clearly that unionizing super-
visors under the Labor Act is inconsistent with the purpose of the act to
increase output of goods that move in the stream of commerce, and thus
to increase its flow. It is inconsistent with the policy of Congress to as-
sure to workers freedom from domination or control by their supervisors
in their organizing and bargaining activities. It is inconsistent with our
B. Taft-Hartley Act
The Taft-Hartley Act 26 was passed by the eightieth Congress in
response to the failure of the Wagner Act to prevent industrial strife
and to overrule the sweeping definition given the term "employees" by
the Supreme Court in Packard 27 The Taft-Hartley Act specifically de-
fines the term "supervisor" as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the em-
ployer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, dis-
charge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.28
Furthermore, the Taft-Hartley Act excludes supervisors from the defi-
nition of "employee. ' 29 Thus, Congress effectively overruled Packard
by preventing supervisors and foremen from composing the collective
bargaining unit as well as demonstrating its intent to exclude entirely
from the NLRA those who fall within the labor-nexus test.
Although the legislation does not expressly refer to the labor-nexus
test, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act is significant to de-
termining whether those falling within the test are excluded only from
the bargaining unit or from the NLRA in toto. The House bill sought a
sweeping exclusion of confidential employees from all protections of
the NLRA.3 ° The bill defined the term "supervisors" to comprise a
wide range of divergent managerial jobs not specifically limited to up-
per management positions.3' Included within this broad description
were employees having the authority to determine or recommend wage
rates, those working in labor relations or personnel departments, and
policy to protect the rights of employers; they, as well as workers, are
entitled to loyal representatives in the plants, but when the foremen
unionize, even in a union that claims to be "independent" of the union
of the rank and file, they are subject to influence and control by the rank
and fie union, and, instead of their bossing the rank and file, the rank
and file bosses them. The evidence shows that rank and file unions have
done much of the actual organizing of foremen, even when the fore-
men's union professes to be "independent." Without any question, this
is why the unions seek to organize the foremen.
Id.
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 14, 17 (1947) (states that the
unionization of supervisors, inter a/ia, decreases productivity and upsets the bal-
ance of power in the collective bargaining process); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3-5 (1947) (same).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
29. Id. § 152(3).
30. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12) (1947).
31. Id
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those given information confidential in nature.32 Supervisors were ex-
plicitly held to be outside the protections of the NLRA.3 3 In sum, the
House bill sought to exclude from the NLRA employees privy to
general financial, operating, and trade secret information, as well as
those involved in labor relations.
Similarly, the Senate bill opted to exclude supervisors from the
term "employee.13 4 However, in contrast to the House version, the
Senate bill narrowly defined those considered "supervisors." 35 Fur-
thermore, under the Senate proposal, confidential employees were
neither expressly exempted from the definition of "employee" nor in-
cluded within the definition of "supervisor.1
36
The Senate definition of "supervisor" was adopted by the confer-
ence committee.37 In its report, the committee states:
The Conference agreement, in the definition of "supervisor,"
limits such term to those individuals treated as supervisors
under the Senate amendment. In the case ofpersons working
in the labor relations, personnel and employment departments, it
was not thought necessary to make s ec"ic provision, as was
done in the House bill, since the Board has treated, andpresum-
ably will continue to treat, such persons as outside the scope of
the act. This is the prevailing Board practice with respect to
such people as confidential secretaries as well, and it was not the
intention of the conferees to alter this practice in any respect. 38
The conference committee report is significant in three respects.
First, it indicates congressional failure to distinguish the NLRB's "pre-
vailing practice" which excluded confidential employees who fell
within the labor-nexus test only from the composition of collective bar-
gaining units, in contrast to Congress' belief that the NLRB excluded
them from the act in toto. Second, the committee contradicts itself
when on the one hand, it appears to distinguish "persons working in
labor relations" from "confidential secretaries" in general, while on the
other hand it states that Congress had no intention to alter prior NLRB
practice. Third, the statement provides valuable insight as to whether
Congress intended that employees who fall within the labor-nexus be
32. Id
33. Id § 2(3).
34. See S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1947).
35. Section 2(11) of the bill read:
The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the in-
terest of the employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely rou-
tine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id § 2(11).
36. See id § 2(3), (11).
37. H.R. CONF. RFP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947).
38. Id (emphasis added).
49919831 Confidential Employees
Baltimore Law Review
totally or partially excluded from the NLRA. In NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co., 39 the Supreme Court stated that "although Congress may
have misconstrued recent Board [NLRB] practice, it clearly thought
that the [NLRA] did not cover 'confidential employees' even under a
broad definition of that term."'  Thus, Bell Aerospace gave rise to a
strong inference that the Supreme Court interpreted the Conference
Committee report to exclude confidential employees from the NLRA
entirely.
III. NLRB INTERPRETATION OF THE LABOR-NEXUS TEST
A. Evolution of the Labor-Nexus Test
Since the Taft-Hartley Act made no mention of the labor-nexus
test, the NLRB, within certain court imposed limitations,4' generally
applies the test as it sees fit. A brief overview of the NLRB's varied
interpretation of the test is necessary to a discussion of the confidential
employee exclusion.
Shortly after the enactment of the Wagner Act, the NLRB deter-
mined that although "confidential employees" are neither expressly ex-
cluded from the NLRA definition of "employees," nor mandated to
enjoy fewer protections under the Act, they are, nonetheless, implicitly
excluded from the composition of collective bargaining units.4 2 Section
9(b) of the Wagner Act empowered the NLRB to "decide in each case
. . . the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
... -3 Through this authority, the NLRB excluded confidential em-
ployees from joining a unit comprised of nonconfidential employees. 44
The determination of whether to impose this exclusion originally cen-
tered upon the degree of access the employee had to labor relations
information.45 Conversely, access to nonlabor related business or
financial information was held "insufficient to justify exclusion from
the right to collective bargaining. ' 46
The extent of labor-related information available to employees
was termed the labor-nexus test.47 If an employee was privy to certain
confidential labor relations information, the employee was deemed to
39. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
40. ld at 284 n. 12.
41. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
42. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 N.L.R.B. 974 (1939).
43. See Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935).
44. See, e.g., Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1321,1322-23 (1944); General Motors Corp., 53
N.L.R.B. 1096, 1099-1105 (1943); Western Union Telegraph Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 492,
499 (1942).
45. See sources cited supra note 44.
46. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 108, 111 (1941); see also NLRB v. Ar-
mour & Co., 154 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir. 1945) (enforcing 54 N.L.R.B. 1005
(1944)) (Creamery Package doctrine), cert. denied 329 U.S. 732 (1946).
47. See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170,
179 (1981).
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fall within the labor-nexus, and was excluded from the collective bar-
gaining unit.4 8 The NLRB explained its rationale thusly:
[I]n negotiating and in the settlement of grievances, the inter-
ests of a union and the management are ordinarily adverse.
[Mianagement should not be required to handle labor rela-
tions matters through employees who are represented by the
union with which the Company is required to deal and who in
the normal performance of their duties may obtain advance
information of the Company's position with regard to con-
tract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor
relations matters.49
In 1946, a year prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act,50 the
NLRB rejected the "access" requirement of the labor-nexus test. In
Ford Motor Co., 51 the NLRB reasoned that the mere access definition
was too inclusive and precluded many employees from bargaining to-
gether with other workers having common interests. Consequently, the
NLRB limited the test "to embrace only those employees who assist
and act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise 'managerial'
functions in the field of labor relations."52 The doctrine enunciated in
Ford Motor remained the prevailing NLRB practice when Congress
enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.
From 1946 to 1956, the NLRB applied the labor-nexus test in a
seemingly ad hoc fashion. 53 For example, shortly after the enactment
of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, the NLRB narrowed the test and held
that to fall within its confines, employees must handle confidential la-
bor relations matters on a plant-wide or company-wide basis, rather
than within the scope of a particular division or department. 4 In 1949,
the NLRB ruled that employees will not be considered "confidential"
unless the labor-nexus is demonstrated to encompass "general labor re-
lations."55 Subsequently, the NLRB returned to its original practice
and excluded from bargaining units those employees who had mere
48. See, e.g., Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 103, 113 (1943); General
Motors Corp., 53 N.L.R.B. 1096, 1099-1105 (1943); Western Union Telegraph
Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 492, 498-500 (1942); Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B.
108, 110 (1941).
49. Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1323 (1944) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
51. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
52. Id at 1322.
53. This phenomena may be attributed to the changing composition of the NLRB, for
during that ten year period no less than thirteen members occupied the five seats
on the Board. See I I NLRB ANN. REP. iii (1946) through 21 NLRB ANN. REP. iii
(1956).
54. Chrysler Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 516, 517 n.8 (1949); see also American Broadcasting
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 74, 77-78 (1953); Wilson & Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1388, 1392 (1952);
Phillips Oil Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 534, 538-39 (1950); Ball Bro. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 34, 37
(1949).
55. Chrysler Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 516, 517-18 n.8 (1949).
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access to confidential labor relations information. 56
In 1956, the NLRB finally expounded a manageable and predict-
able standard to assess whether employees fall within the scope of the
labor-nexus test. In B.F Goodrich Co. 57 the NLRB reaffirmed the Ford
Motor standard5" and limited the definition of confidential employees
"so as to embrace only those employees who assist and act in a confi-
dential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations."59 This definition
of the labor-nexus test was recently upheld by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membershp Corp. 60
In Hendricks, the NLRB initially held that the secretary to the top
executive officer and general manager of a corporation fell outside the
labor-nexus test, and therefore could be included in a collective bar-
gaining Unit. 6 1 The NLRB maintained that pursuant to the B.F Good-
rich Co.62 standard, the secretary was not a confidential employee
because she did not "assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons
who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the
field of labor relations." 63 Hendricks was ordered to reinstate the sec-
retary to her former job, or to a substantially equivalent position, with
backpay.64
Hendricks appealed the NLRB's decision to the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Aerospace pre-
cluded enforcement of the order.65 The court agreed with Hendricks
and flatly rejected the labor-nexus test as developed by the NLRB. 66
56. Potomac Electric Power Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 553, 562 (1955) (clerk-stenographers
and clerk-typists found to regularly have access to labor relations information
therefore excluded); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1191,
1192 (1954) (secretaries to department heads not confined to labor relations ex-
cluded); Curtis-Wright Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 458, 462-63 (1953) (staff analyst ex-
cluded on grounds of access to confidential manpower schedules but clerical
assistants included because no access to labor relations in record); Bond Stores,
Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1031 n.4 (1952) (head cashiers found to have access to all
confidential memoranda, some of which concerned labor relations policies there-
fore excluded); Southeastern Telephone Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 4, 7 (1946) (personnel
records available to department head secretaries therefore excluded).
57. 115 N.L.R.B. 722 (1956).
58. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
59. B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722 (1956).
60. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
61. Hendricks, 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619 (1978), revd and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th
Cir. 1979), on reman, 247 N.L.R.B. 498, rev'd, 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd,
454 U.S. 170 (1981).
62. 115 N.L.R.B. 722 (1956). See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
63. Hendricks, 236 N.L.R.B. at 1620.
64. Id
65. 603 F.2d at 25.
66. Id at 30. The court of appeals remanded the case back to the NLRB to determine
whether the secretary worked in a confidential capacity for her employer without
regard to labor relations. Id. On remand, the NLRB again applied the labor-
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Upon review of the court of appeals' second opinion, the Supreme
Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's holding that employees who have
access to confidential, general business information are implicitly ex-
cluded from the NLRA.67 In addition, the Court rejected the assertion
that its statement in BellAerospace, that Congress "clearly thought that
the Act did not cover 'confidential employees' even under a broad defi-
nition of that term," was dispositive.6" Instead, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that at the time the conference committee approved the NLRB's
"prevailing practice,"69 Congress had adequate notice of the test as
enunciated in Ford Motor Co. 70 Therefore, the subsequent passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act indicated that Congress intended the labor-nexus
refinement to continue.7' In response to the statement proffered in Bell
Aerospace, the Court simply admitted that it was made "[in] error" and
upheld the NLRB's use of the labor-nexus test.72 The Court stated that
the labor-nexus test which excludes from the bargaining unit those em-
ployees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who
formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field
of labor relations has a "reasonable basis in law."
B. Present Application of Labor-Nexus Test
The labor-nexus test is presently employed by the NLRB to ex-
clude from the bargaining unit employees who "assist and act in a con-
fidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. '74 Unfortunately,
other than caselaw, the NLRB does not provide any guidelines to aid in
the application of the labor-nexus test to specific factual situations.75
nexus test and concluded that the secretary did not have sufficient involvement in
labor relations to warrant excluding her from protections under the Act. 247
N.L.R.B. at 498. The Board's second opinion was again reversed by the Seventh
Circuit. 627 F.2d at 766.
67. 454 U.S. at 184.
68. Id at 187 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 284 n.12 (1974)).
69. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
70. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946). See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
71. Hendricks, 454 U.S. at 188.
72. Id at 187, 190.
73. Id at 190. However, in affirming the NLRB's finding that the secretary fell
outside the labor-nexus, the Supreme Court made clear the unusual character of
her duties as compared to executive secretaries in general by stating:
We do not suggest that personal secretaries to the chief executive officers
of corporations will ordinarily not constitute confidential employees.
Hendricks is an unusual case, inasmuch as [the secretary's] tasks were
"deliberately restricted so as to preclude her from" gaining access to
confidential information concerning labor relations. Whether Hendricks
imposed such constraints on [the secretary] out of specific distrust or
merely a sense of caution, it is unlikely that the secretary's position mir-
rored that of executive secretaries in general.
Id at 191 n.23 (citation omitted).
74. B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956).
75. The Board, in its administrative capacity, favors adjudication rather than rule-
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Therefore, NLRB caselaw must be interpreted to ascertain the relevant
factors that govern whether an employee falls within the labor-nexus.
An employee's mere access to labor relations,"6 general business,
or financial' information is insufficient to render him within the labor-
nexus. Similarly, the employee's possession of trade, product, technical
information,"' or involvement with matters that pertain to national se-
curity7 9 are inadequate to place the employee within the exclusion. In
sum, a worker's participation in labor relations must be specific,80 be
for his own employer, 8 and be on a plant-wide or company-wide ba-
sis82 in order to satisfy the NLRB's requisites for exclusion from a bar-
making in effectuating the purposes of the NLRA. See, e.g., Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-554 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
76. See, e.g., Brodart Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 380, 384-85 n.10 (1981) (payroll office em-
ployee not confidential solely on basis of access); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 240
N.L.R.B. 162, 163 (1979) (credit reporters having access to labor relations data
insufficient to render them confidential); Victor Indus. Corp., 215 N.L.R.B. 48
(1974) (payroll employee having access to personnel records which might eventu-
ally be utilized in labor negotiations not confidential).
77. See, e.g., Maidsville Coal Co., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 1106, 1116 (1981), enforcement
denied 693 F.2d 1119 (4th Cir. 1982) (work "entailing sensitive data and/or infor-
mation. . . too broad a base of disenfranchisement of employees from. . . statu-
tory rights"); Air Express Int'l Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 478, 502 (1979), enforced, 670
F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1982) (employee participating in confidential customer infor-
mation not involving labor relations held not confidential); Community Service
Planning Council, 243 N.L.R.B. 798, 800 (1979) (fiscal officer engaged in auditing
not confidential); Ohio State Legal Services Asso., 239 N.L.R.B. 594, 599 (1978)
(accounting specialist handling financial data not confidential).
78. See, e.g., Colt Indus. Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 723, 727-28 (1977) (research and manu-
facture product technicians not confidential); see also Swift & Co., 119 N.L.R.B.
1556, 1567 (1958); Barrett Div. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 1649,
1652 (1956).
79. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 734, 744 (1954) (employees having
access to data and other material classified as confidential and restricted for secur-
ity reasons by the Atomic Energy Commission not confidential); Consolidated
Vultee Aircraft Corp., 92 N.L.R.B. 1290 n.1 (1951) (employees who reproduce
and have access to designs and information restricted by the Air Force held not
confidential employees).
80. See ITT Grinnell Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 584, 586 (1981) (potential participation in
labor relations must be absolute, mere speculation as to when an employee might
be involved held insufficient to render confidential status); ITT Grinnell Corp.,
212 N.L.R.B. 734 (1974) (implying that future involvement in labor relations poli-
cies will deem one, for present purposes, confidential).
81. See, e.g., Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, 253 N.L.R.B. 447 (1980) (aw firm clericals
not confidential employees despite satisfying the labor-nexus test in regard to cli-
ents); Kleinberg, Kaplan, Wolff, Cohen & Burrows, P.C., 253 N.L.R.B. 450, 457
(1980) (advice to employer-clients on labor relations matters does not require
-holding that employees are confidential); Kaplan, Sicking, Hessen, Sugarman,
Rosenthal & Zientz, 250 N.L.R.B. 483, 485 (1980) (all clericals in labor law firm
not confidential on the basis of handling labor relations of third parties).
82. See, e.g., Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 1387, 1388-89
(1981) (employee assisting supervisor in compiling information for use in collec-
tive bargaining not confidential employee); Holly Sugar Corp., 193 N.L.R.B.
1024, 1026 (1971) (compilation of information for use by others insufficient in and
of itself to render an employee confidential); Standard Brands, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B.
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gaining unit. Although the aforementioned guidelines provide a
general synopsis of factors the employer should consider in a confiden-
tial employee situation, the practitioner should not lose sight of the fact
that the NLRB, not the employer, will ultimately determine whether
the employee falls within the labor-nexus.
An employer may attempt to take a number of active measures to
protect the company's confidential information. An employer may al-
ter job descriptions and employee responsibilities in an effort to modify
the number of employees who fall within the labor-nexus. For exam-
ple, employers can expand the group of employees who fall within the
labor-nexus by delegating labor relations responsibilities to employees
already in positions of trust, but who would not otherwise satisfy the
test. Furthermore, employers can alter job descriptions and create
ficticious involvements in labor relations for employees who would not
normally be exposed to such information to ensure labor-nexus status.
Moreover, an employer may increase the span of authority of those
already involved in labor relations to include more lower-level employ-
ees within the labor-nexus. 83
A more desirable alternative is to reduce the number of employees
who qualify for the exclusion." An employer could reduce the amount
of nonlabor related confidential information that reaches employees
who otherwise would not fall within the labor-nexus. This would en-
sure that all types of confidential information are placed only within
the exclusive realm of the predetermined labor-nexus employees. This
type of employer self-protection does not run the risk of subverting
NLRB policy and simultaneously permits an employer to protect confi-
dential information that pertains to labor relations as well as general
business information.
In sum, if an employee is considered to fall within the labor-nexus
by the NLRB, that worker is excluded from the composition of a col-
lective bargaining unit. The oft-evaded question then arises as to
whether exclusion from the bargaining unit precludes the confidential
employee from enjoying other protections guaranteed by the NLRA.
Section 7 of the NLRA expounds to whom the Act applies:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
1349, 1354 (1952) (supplying factual data in connection with contract negotiations
insufficient to support allegation of confidential employee).
83. By placing labor relations responsibilities on more supervisory and managerial
personnel, the employees would then "assist and act in a confidential capacity to
persons who formulate, determine and effectuate management policy in the field
of labor relations." B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956). However,
other restrictions the Board places on the labor-nexus test may negate the employ-
ees' status as confidential. See supra notes 76-82.
84. This approach would not, as contrasted to the aforementioned approach, pose the
possibility of circumventing employee rights under the NLRA because more em-
ployees would enjoy protections under the Act.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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Join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).86
Thus, the issue may be phrased in terms of section 7 rights: Are labor-
nexus employees denied only that particular section 7 right to "bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing" or are such
employees stripped of all the rights accorded "employees" in section 7?
IV. TOTAL OR PARTIAL EXCLUSION OF LABOR-NEXUS
EMPLOYEES?
In NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membershp Corp., 
87
the NLRB asserted, in the alternative, that if the secretary did fall
within the labor-nexus test, and therefore is excluded from the bargain-
ing unit, she should still be accorded the protection of the NLRA to
engage in concerted activity as provided for in section 7.ss However,
since the secretary was considered to be outside the labor-nexus, the
Supreme Court refused to address the NLRB's contention. 9 This
omission has generated significant controversy and confusion, for the
disposition of the issue whether a confidential employee is only par-
tially excluded from the rights in section 7 is of paramount concern to
both employers and employees alike.
Inevitably, some confidential or labor-nexus employees will en-
gage in concerted activity that proves detrimental to the employer's in-
terests."° When this occurs, the employer must determine whether the
86. Id (emphasis added).
87. 236 N.L.R.B. 1616 (1978), rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979), on
remand, 247 N.L.R.B. 498, rev'd, 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 170
(1981).
88. Brief for Petitoner at 18 & n. 14, NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Mem-
bership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981). In its brief, the NLRB argued that "the Board
has treated such employees as otherwise fully protected under the Act." For au-
thority, the NLRB cited the following cases: Peavey Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 853
(1980), enforced in part, 648 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1981); Service Technology Corp.,
196 N.L.R.B. 1036 (1972), enforced mem., 480 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
med, 415 U.S. 948 (1974); Southern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 627
(1968), enforced, 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970); Southern Colorado Power Co., 13
N.L.R.B. 699 (1939), enforced, 111 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1940); American Book-
Stratford Press, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 914 (1948); and Coopersville Cooperative Eleva-
tor Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1948). Notwithstanding the impressive array of au-
thority cited by the NLRB, an analysis of these cases reveals no direct support for
the NLRB's position. See notes 91-123 infra and accompanying text.
89. Hendricks, 454 U.S. 170, 185-86 n.19 (1981).
90. The majority of employers with any sizeable workforce will have "labor-nexus"
employees within their organization.
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NLRA precludes the initiation of sanctions against that employee. If
the employee is only partially excluded from the NLRA, the employer
runs the risk that any sanctions imposed will be considered an unfair
labor practice. However, an in-depth analysis of the NLRB's argument
in support of partial exclusion disproves the Board's own proposition
that employees who fall within the labor-nexus are only excluded from
the composition of bargaining units.
A. Court Decisions Supporting Partial Exclusion
Although a Supreme Court resolution is necessary, the confusion
in the lower courts is not as detrimental as it first appears. After analyz-
ing the decisions in favor of partial exclusion, the flaws in their reason-
ing become obvious.
The first case that arguably addressed the total/partial exclusion
issue is Southern Colorado Power Co. 9 1 Although the NLRB's decision
was enforced by the Tenth Circuit, the total/partial exclusion issue was
not raised in the AL's hearing and therefore the NLRB could not ad-
judicate the employer's contention without some substantiation in the
record below. The NLRB ordered Southern Colorado to reinstate two
employees who were found to be unlawfully discharged for engaging in
union organizing activities.92 The NLRB rejected the employer's con-
tention that office accounting employees have a special relationship
with management and stated:
The alleged confidential tie rests for its existence, however,
upon the bare assertions. . . without an adequate showing of
the nature of the information to which the office employees
may have had access, or the extent to which such confidential
tie would preclude the organization of the office employees
for the purposes of collective bargainn. In any event the Act
vests in employees the right to determine for themselves the
feasibility of joining, forming, or assisting in the establish-
ment of a labor organization. Nor does it withhold the exer-
cise of such right from confidential employees as a class.9
3
Despite the fact that the case was subsequently affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit, Southern Colorado cannot realistically be relied upon to
support the partial exclusion argument. First, aside from the fact that
the case was decided prior to both the NLRB's development of the la-
bor-nexus test and the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the record did
not show that the employees were confidential, due to their lack of "ac-
cess" to or actual involvement in managerial responsibilities.94 Hence,
such rank and file employees would naturally be accorded all protec-
91. 13 N.L.R.B. 699 (1939), enforced, 111 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1940).
92. 13 N.L.R.B. at 710, 719.
93. Id at 710.
94. Id
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tions under the NLRA. Second, the NLRB's statement that confiden-
tial employees as a class are not precluded from joining their own
union is misleading. The NLRA protects "employees" engaged in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection.95 Conversely, those workers not within the
NLRA's definition of "employees" may join labor organizations and
engage in other concerted activities; however, the NLRA does not pro-
vide for their protection.96 Furthermore, confidential employees within
the labor-nexus are, for the purposes of the NLRA, considered outside
the definition of "employees. ' 97 Thus, in light of the Taft-Hartley Act,
any reliance on Southern Colorado appears to be erroneous.98
The only decision that may be interpreted as supporting partial
exclusion, at least on its face, is Southern Greyhound Lines, Inc. 99
There, a clerical worker, a confidential employee by stipulation, was
excluded from a bargaining unit comprised of other clerical workers
pursuant to the terms of the governing collective bargaining agree-
ment.l° When the confidential employee refused to cross a picket line,
she was discharged for disobeying specific instructions to report to
work. The NLRB found the discharge unlawful on the grounds that an
employee may "assist a labor organization regardless of whether [the
employee] is eligible for membership in it. . . ." " The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision and held that the confi-
dential employee was engaged in protected concerted activity and,
therefore, was fully protected under the NLRA.102
Although Southern Greyhound appears to support partial exclusion
from the NLRA for employees who fall within the labor-nexus, two
fatal flaws are evident. First, the NLRB erroneously relied upon its
prior decisions when it held that any employee, including those outside
the definition of "employee" in the Act and regardless of the em-
ployee's eligibility for union membership, is protected when assisting a
labor organization. Contrary to the NLRB's reasoning in Southern
Greyhound all employees are not protected from adverse employer
sanctions when they choose to assist labor organizations. 0 3 For in-
95. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
96. Rights under the NLRA are accorded to "employees" only. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157,
164(a) (1976).
97. It is incongruous to assert that confidential employees are denied some section 7
protections yet accorded others since the section applies to "employees" in general
without making any distinctions between the type of employees.
98. The issues litigated in the case are mooted by the Taft-Hartley Act. See supra
notes 26-38.
99. 169 N.L.R.B. 627 (1968), enforced, 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970).
100. 169 N.L.R.B. at 627.
101. Id at 628.
102. 426 F.2d at 1302.
103. Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA provides that it is "an unfair labor practice for an
employer ...to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it. . . ." 29
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stance, the Supreme Court holds that managerial employees,1o4 as well
as certain faculty employees, 5 fall outside all protections of the
NLRA.' ° The reason proffered by the Court for excluding managerial
employees from the NLRA is the same as that asserted for excluding
confidential employees. Since both positions are closely aligned with
management, it is considered fundamentally sound that their interests
should not conflict." 7 Moreover, if such employees are permitted to
actively participate in union affairs, their activities may be construed as
employer interference in violation of sections 8(a)(1) Os and 8(a)(2) 1°9
of the NLRA.
Second, the NLRB was ambiguous when it stated that confidential
status is only relevant to the composition of the collective bargaining
unit, and has no impact on the disposition of unfair labor practice
charges." 0 This view is specious since confidential employees who fall
within the labor-nexus are precluded from the protections affiliated
with joining a union, and therefore have no interest in participating in
the collective bargaining process or activities pertaining thereto."I'
Finally, the employer in Southern Greyhound failed to argue that
the employee was totally excluded from the NLRA's protections be-
cause of her confidential status. This omission led to a seemingly erro-
neous ruling by the ALJ that:
Although at the hearing, counsel for Respondent appeared to
go to great pains to prove that Anderson was a confidential
secretary, and counsel for the General Counsel [went] to
equally great pains to prove that she was not, each now con-
cedes, and I agree, that whether Anderson was protected in her
right to refuse to cross the picket line to come to work is unaf-ficted by any determination as to whether she isproperly classi-
fied as a confidential secretary. Southern Colorado Power Co.,
13 N.L.R.B. 699. There is no suggestion in the record that
U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976) (emphasis added). Section 2(2) of the NLRA provides
that the "term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer
.. 'd. § 152(2). Thus a supervisor or other non-"employee" not eligible for
membership in a particular unit may not interfere or assist any labor organization.
104. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974).
105. NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1980).
106. The Supreme Court holds that their status is not that of an "employee" as defined
in section 2(3) of the NLRA. See cases cited supra notes 104-05.
107. See cases cited supra notes 104-05.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
109. Id § 158(a)(2).
110. In essence, the NLRB formulated a double standard when it stated that a confi-
dential employee satisfying the labor-nexus test was not an "employee" for the
purposes of joining a particular bargaining unit but was an "employee" for the
purposes of assessing whether the employer violated the NLRA.
111. Confidential employees do not have any direct interest in the labor organization
although, arguably, the unionization of other employees may lead to improved
working conditions and higher wages for confidential employees on the basis of
parity.
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Anderson ever disclosed to any employee any matters of a
confidential nature or that Respondent ever believed she
would do so.112
The ALJ misapplied NLRB precedent, because Southern Colorado was
decided by the NLRB in 1939, eight years prior to the enactment of the
Taft-Hartley Act which materially changed the definition of "em-
ployee." Furthermore, if the ALJ's determination was valid, why did
the General Counsel," 3 at least initially, "go to equally great pains to
prove that she was not"" 4 a confidential employee unless he felt that a
finding of confidentiality would result in a dismissal of the unfair labor
practice charge?
For the aforementioned reasons, Southern Greyhound cannot be
relied upon to support the NLRB's contention of partial exclusion.
Since the ALJ erroneously misled the employer's counsel, the total/
partial exclusion issue was never actually litigated before the court. In-
stead, Southern Greyhound appears to be based on the doctrine that if a
class of employees are expressly excluded from comprising aparticular
collective bargaining unit, as opposed to any collective bargaining unit,
that group is not automatically stripped of other NLRA protections." 5
This doctrine is based on section 9(a)" 16 of the NLRA which empowers
the NLRB to determine the "unit appropriate" for collective bargain-
ing. "' Thus, if an employee is excluded from a unit comprised of em-
ployees with a different community of interest, she is still an employee
within the NLRA and thus may be included in a unit with other em-
ployees similarly situated." 8
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was the first court to
specifically address the issue of whether a confidential employee is to-
tally or partially excluded from the NLRA's protections. In NLRB v.
Poultrymen's Service Corp., 119 the NLRB upheld the ALJ's finding that
the employer violated the Act with respect to confidential secretaries
excluded from the bargaining unit.' 20 On appeal, the employer argued
that confidential employees satisfying the labor-nexus test are excluded
from the NLRA in toto and thus he could not have violated the Act.' 2 '
112. Southern Greyhound, 169 N.L.R.B. at 627 n.2 (emphasis added).
113. The General Counsel of the NLRB has "final authority, on behalf of the Board, in
respect to the investigation of charges and. . . the prosecution of such complaints
before the Board .. " 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976).
114. 169 N.L.R.B. at 627 n.2.
115. See, e.g., Mosler Safe Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 650, 651 (1971); Robbins & Myers, Inc.,
144 N.L.R.B. 295, 298-99 (1963); Vulcanized Rubber and Plastics Co., 129
N.L.R.B. 1256, 1257 (1961); Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 1364,
1365 (1957).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
117. Id
118. See cases cited supra note 115.
119. 41 N.L.R.B. 444 (1942), enforced, 138 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1943).
120. 41 N.L.R.B. at 445-48.
121. 138 F.2d at 210.
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The Third Circuit summarily held that the exclusion of confidential
employees from bargaining units "does not deprive [them] of the
[other] benefits of the Act."' 2 2
Despite the Third and Fifth Circuits' holdings in favor of partial
exclusion, the decisions lose their viability when examined in light of
their factual backgrounds. Poultrymen's Service was decided in 1943,
four years prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act. 123 Since the
case was decided under the Wagner Act and the subsequent Taft-Hart-
ley Act substantially modified the scope of "employees" protected
under the NLRA, the decision is not applicable to the present statutory
language. In Southern Greyhound the employer simply failed to pursue
the argument that confidential employees are totally excluded from all
provisions of the Act.
B. Court Decisions Supporting Total Exclusion
The Fourth Circuit was the first court to expressly hold that confi-
dential employees who satisfy the labor-nexus test are excluded from
all protections under the NLRA. In NLRB v. Wheeling Electric Co., 124
the Fourth Circuit rejected the NLRB's finding that the employer vio-
lated the NLRA when he discharged a confidential employee engaged
in otherwise protected, concerted activity. 125 The court relied on the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act to disagree with the NLRB's
interpretation of the conference agreement.
The Board admits it has always excluded confidential em-
ployees from rank-and-file bargainingunits. However, it does
not point to a single case in which the Board has certified a
bargaining unit made up entirely of confidential employ-
ees. 2' The treatment of confidential employees by the Board
before 1947 could therefore be properly construed by the
Congress as it did - that they were not to be afforded the
protection of the Act. We think, additionally, that the Board's
continued practice after the enactment of the 1947 Amend-
ments can also be properly construed as treating confidential
employees in accordance with the intended scope of the Act,
ie., as "supervisors."'' 2 7
Consequently, the court held that since management is entitled "secur-
ity of its confidential information . . . confidential employees cannot
be granted the protections afforded ordinary employees under the
122. Id
123. The Taft-Hartley Act was enacted into law in 1947. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
124. 444 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971).
125. Id at 788.
126. This reasoning is questionable. There is nothing in the NLRA that proscribes
such a unit. However, any concerted activity in furtherance of such a unit is not
protected by the NLRA.
127. Wheeling Electric, 444 F.2d at 786.
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Act."128
Shortly after Wheeling Electric, the Eighth Circuit, in NLRB v.
North Arkansas Electric Coop., Inc., 129 adopted the rationale of the
Fourth Circuit and denied enforcement of a NLRB order that required
reinstatement of a confidential employee who was discharged for refus-
ing to obey instructions. 3 ° The court's independent reading of the
Taft-Hartley's legislative history furnished an additional basis upon
which to reject the NLRB's contention of partial exclusion. The court
stated:
We find nothing in the Act or its legislative history to indicate
Congress intended the word "employee" to have one defini-
tion for the purpose of determining a proper bargaining unit
and another definition for the purpose of determinin& which
employees are protected from being fired for union activity.' 3'
As the Eighth Circuit indicates, once an employee is stripped of "em-
ployee" status for the purposes of becoming a member of a bargaining
unit, he is removed from all protections accorded "employees" under
the NLRA.
The Second Circuit also favors total exclusion from the NLRA for
employees who fall within the labor-nexus test. In Bell Aerospace Co. v.
NLRB, 132 the court noted that while the congressional conference re-
port does contain some ambiguities as to the total/partial exclusion of
confidential employees, "neither the Senate, nor the House ...
thought the exclusion would be limited to persons precisely fitting the
Act's definition of 'supervisor'."'' 33 Instead, the court maintains that
Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act with the understanding that em-
ployees who are closely aligned with management are to be excluded
from the NLRA in toto. 13 Moreover, in Peerless of America, Inc. v.
NLRB, '31 the Seventh Circuit held that the status of confidential em-
ployees renders those employees akin to supervisors; thus, they are ex-
128. Id at 788.
129. 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
130. Id at 610.
131. Id at 609-10.
132. 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973), enforced in part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
133. 475 F.2d at 491.
134. Id at 494 n. 13. The court noted that:
Congress may have misapprehended the Board's pre-1947 practice with
regard to confidential employees. [T]he Board had apparently excluded
such employees from bargaining units of rank and file personnel but had
not ruled that they were unprotected by the Act. Thus, when the Con-
ference Committee stated that the Board had treated these employees
"as outside the scope of the act," it may have been in error. Nevertheless,
since Congress' reason for not expanding the definition of supervisor was its
belief that existing Board practices made this unnecessary, that intent
should be given effect.
Id (emphasis added).
135. 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973).
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eluded from the definition of "employees" entitled section 7 rights
under the NLRA. 13 6 The Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning em-
ployed in Wheeling Electric and found it illogical to hold a confidential
employee within the meaning of "employee" for some purposes of sec-
tion 7, yet outside that meaning for the purpose of inclusion in the bar-
gaining unit.
13 7
Thus, the circuit courts that favor total exclusion of confidential
employees from protections under the NLRA all recognize the incon-
sistencies inherent in the partial exclusion theory when viewed in light
of the statutory policy to promote collective bargaining. The courts
uniformly reason that whenever an employee is excluded from the bar-
gaining unit (due to status as a confidential employee, manager, or su-
pervisor) there is no justification to provide additional protections to
them since the object of the accompanying protections is absent.'38 As
stated by the Fourth Circuit in Wheeling Electric.-
It strikes us as nonsense for the Board to exclude [a labor-
nexus employee] from the bargaining unit and then extend to
her the same protection for the same concerted activity that
she would have enjoyed if a union member . . . . Since [a
confidential employee] cannot formally join the unit, there is
nothing incongruous in holding that [a confidential employee]
cannot "plight her troth" with the unit.'3 9
C The NLRB Position
Despite the above discussion, the NLRB continues to adhere to its
policy of partial exclusion of the NLRA's protections for those employ-
ees who fall within the labor-nexus test. 4° Hence, if an unfair labor
136. Id at 1112.
137. Id
138. The purpose of the NLRA and its accompanying protections is to ensure to em-
ployees the right to engage in collective bargaining. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
139. NLRB v. Wheeling Electric Co., 444 F.2d 783, 788 (4th Cir. 1971).
140. See, e.g., Peavey Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 853 n.3 (1980), enforced in part, 648 F.2d 460
(7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the Fourth and Seventh Circuit holdings to the contrary
in a case arising in the Seventh Circuit); Los Angeles New Hospital, 244 N.L.R.B.
960, 962 n.4 (1979), enforced, 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981) (the AL's "finding
that confidential employees do not enjoy protection under the Act, although con-
sistent with the decisions of several courts of appeals, is, with all respect to those
courts of appeals, inconsistent with current board law"); Service Technology
Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1036, 1043 (1972), enforced mem., 480 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Wheeling as not binding on the Board in the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction). In one
case, however, the NLRB employed a "breach of trust" theory to uphold the dis-
charge of a corporate president's private secretary. American Book-Stratford
Press Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 914 (1948). There the secretary had previously promised
the president that she would not participate in any union activities. Nevertheless,
the secretary showed a copy of the president's statement on union attempts to
organize the corporation to a co-chairman of the employees' union committee.
The NLRB refused to order the corporation to reinstate the secretary after her
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practice charge, which pertains to a labor-nexus employee, arises in a
circuit that has not expressly ruled in favor of total exclusion,' 41 the
NLRB will ignore the majority of circuit court decisions and follow its
position of partial exclusion. 42  Furthermore, in proceedings held
within the jurisdiction of those courts expressly in favor of total exclu-
sion for labor-nexus employees, the NLRB refuses to be bound to those
circuit court decisions.' 43
To achieve its preference for partial exclusion, the NLRB invokes
the doctrine it enunciated in Insurance Agent's International Union, "
which states that the ALJ has "the duty to apply established Boardpre-
cedent which the Board or the Supreme Court has not reversed."' 45
The NLRB has even gone so far as to hold that an AL's reliance on
decisions of the circuit courts constitutesfundamental error. 14 Conse-
quently, until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, any argument before
the NLRB that a confidential employee falling within the labor-nexus
test is totally excluded from the NLRA would appear to be futile, even
when the circuit court holds in favor of total exclusion. As a result,
employers who seek a reversal of the NLRB's policy to partially ex-
clude a confidential employee are forced to litigate the issue before the
ALJ and the NLRB before the court of appeals has an opportunity to
rule in the employer's favor. Hence, administrative mechanisms'47
coupled with the doctrine enunciated in Insurance Agent's work against
the employer who believes that the court of appeals will ultimately
hold in favor of total exclusion.
V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OPEN QUESTION
Presently, employers are uncertain of what actions they may initi-
ate against confidential employees without incurring a risk that they
will commit an unfair labor practice. In a circuit where partial exclu-
sion appears to be, or may be, favored the employer must distinguish
between employee activities that pertain to the bargaining unit and
discharge, concluding that employees who exhibit a special relationship of trust to
their employer are outside protections of the NLRA. Id at 915, 917.
141. The First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have not ex-
pressly held that confidential employees are totally excluded from the Act.
142. See, e.g., Los Angeles New Hospital, 244 N.L.R.B. 960, 962 n.4 (1979), enforced,
640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
143. See, e.g., Peavey Co. 249 N.L.R.B. 853 n.3 (1980), enforced in part, 648 F.2d 460
(7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the Fourth and Seventh Circuit holdings to the contrary
in a case arising in the Seventh Circuit).
144. 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957), enforcement deniedper curiam, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.
1958), rev'd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
145. 119 N.L.R.B. at 773 (emphasis added); see also Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144
N.L.R.B. 615, 616-17 (1963), modeled, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964); North Coun-
try Motors, Ltd., 133 N.L.R.B. 1479, 1485 (1961); Novak Logging Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 1573, 1575-76 (1958).
146. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 615, 616-17 (1963), mod#Fed, 331 F.2d 176
(8th Cir. 1964).
147. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.1-.16 (1983).
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other types of protected, concerted action. In the former situation, it
appears that confidential employees are not protected. However, one
may argue to the contrary by asserting that confidential employees are
merely excluded from the composition of the collective bargaining unit,
and any activity not directly attributed to that composition is protected
activity. Such an argument is premised on the theory that confidential
employees may do anything in furtherance of the union except join
it.'48 This reasoning is easily repudiated. If confidential employees
may participate in any activity in furtherance of union organization
except join the union, it seems fair and logical that they may participate
in any activity to defeat unionization. The latter proposition would
likely be found to be an employer unfair labor practice in violation of
section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. 149 No matter what the resolution of the
above matter may be, the employer is still left with the problem of de-
termining at what point he may restrain a confidential employee from
participating in union activities. For example, it is clear in jurisdictions
that adhere to the partial exclusion rule that a confidential employee
may legitimately distribute union buttons, because the activity does not
relate to composition of the bargaining unit. However, it is questiona-
ble whether the same employee may be permitted to transmit confiden-
tial labor relations information to union organizers. Yet, in
jurisdictions favoring total exclusion, the employer need not make any
distinction between activities that do or do not concern the bargaining
unit since confidential employees are deprived of all section 7 rights.
Rather than risk the consequences of an unfair labor practice
charge, the employer may opt not to institute any adverse action
against the confidential employee. In such a circumstance, the em-
ployer would then be reluctant to convey any confidential labor rela-
tions information to an employee who might manifest an intention to
support a union. This, in turn, could render the status of "confidential
employee" virtually meaningless.
Employers are not the only parties who may attempt to circumvent
the total/partial exclusion issue. The NLRB goes to great lengths to
avoid the issue, often reaching to find employees outside the labor-
nexus and thus nonconfidential. 0 In Los Angeles New Hospital5 ' for
example, the NLRB reversed the ALJ's finding that an employee was
within the labor-nexus, despite the fact that the ALJ strictly applied the
NLRB's labor-nexus test.' The courts additionally serve to perpetu-
148. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976).
150. See, e.g., Kleinberg, Kaplan, Wolff, Cohen & Burrows, P.C., 253 N.L.R.B. 450
(1980); Union Oil Co. of California, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 818 (1978), enforced, 607
F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Rish Equipment Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 1139 (1980),
enforcement denied, 687 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1982).
151. 244 N.L.R.B. 960 (1979), enforced, 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
152. 244 N.L.R.B. at 967 (1979). The ALl's finding and analysis included:
[The employee] served as [employer's negotiations representative's] per-
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ate the skirting of this significant, but evasive, problem when they con-
sistently support NLRB rulings that an employee is outside the labor-
nexus and, thus not a confidential employee. 53 For example, when the
NLRB sought enforcement of its order in Los Angeles New Hospital,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the ruling and
stated:
The Board did note that the ALJ made a finding inconsistent
with current Board law when he concluded that the concerted
activities of confidential employees go completely unprotected
under the Act. Likewise, we need not reach the labor nexus
question. . . of the extent of coverage of confidential employees
under the Act if we conclude that substantial evidence on the
record as a whole supports the Board's finding that [the em-
ployeel did not have the requisite confidential relationship
with [the employer's labor relations representative]. 54
Hence, it appears clear that courts will not squarely decide the issue of
total or partial exclusion for confidential employees until the NLRB
properly presents the question to the court.
Thus, until the Supreme Court decides the issue of total/partial
exclusion, an employer is unguided as to what he may do when confi-
dential employees engage in concerted activities that do not directly
relate to inclusion in the bargaining unit. Moreover, the openness of
the question is also detrimental to the public, for the NLRB utilizes
public appropriations every time it litigates this issue.'
55
sonal and confidential secretary: she typed and filed all of the [represen-
tative's] correspondence, including all personnel-related documents and
proposed employee relations memoranda or bulletins. . . . Based on
the record before me, including the testimony of [the alleged confidential
employee], I find that she was at all times material hereto [a] confidential
secretary . . . . [T]he Board restricts only those employees whose in-
volvement in their employer's labor relations policies is regular and sub-
stantial. In this instance I find [the employee's] duties concerning the
hospital's employee relations policies regular and substantial and feel
that she should be treated as an excluded confidential employee.
Id
In addition, the ALJ, relying on Wheeling Electric and similar cases, rejected
the General Counsel's argument that confidential employees are nonetheless ac-
corded protections under the Act. Id
153. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S.
170 (1981); NLRB v. Los Angeles New Hospital, 640 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
But see NLRB v. Rish Equipment Co., 687 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1982).
154. Los Angeles New Hospital, 640 F.2d at 1023 (emphasis added).
155. However, a relatively recent statute may possibly deter an administrative agency
from pursuing a course of action not "substantially justified" by providing for
recovery of attorney's fees and costs to prevailing private parties who qualify.
Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. V 1981); see also
Haynes-Trane Service Agency, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 83 (1982).
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VI. EMPLOYER APPROACHES TO NLRB DECISIONS
The employer's first obstacle on appeal of an NLRB decision find-
ing a particular employee outside the labor-nexus or holding that a la-
bor-nexus employee is only partially excluded from the NLRA is to
overcome the fact that the NLRB's interpretation of'the NLRA is enti-
tled great weight. 156 Furthermore, an NLRB determination of the la-
bor-nexus status of an employee is considered to be one offact. I"7
Since the NLRA provides that "questions of fact, if supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall. . . be con-
clusive, '  a reviewing court may only consider the evidence on the
record 59 and is without authority to substitute its own judgment for
that of the NLRB's.160 Consequently, if an employer chooses to appeal
a NLRB finding that an employee is not within the labor-nexus when
an unfair labor practice is alleged, his only alternative is to seek review
on the theory that the NLRB erred in its legal conclusion. The em-
ployer should argue that the NLRB's conclusion is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's application of the labor-nexus test as applied in
NLRB v Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp. 161 Con-
versely, employers who attempt to reverse an NLRB decision in favor
of partial exclusion for a labor-nexus employee should always raise the
issue that a majority of the federal courts of appeals hold otherwise. 62
In support of the total exclusion of confidential employees who
satisfy the labor-nexus test, an employer may proffer that partial exclu-
sion is inconsistent with the purposes of the NLRA because the statute
is designed to protect employee interests in collective bargaining.
163
When a particular employee is excluded from the collective bargaining
unit, and thus not accorded the right to "bargain collectively,"'" the
NLRA becomes inapplicable. It should be argued that it is in contra-
vention of congressional intent for the NLRB to dissect section 7 rights
156. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
157. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 173
(1981).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976).
159. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951).
160. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965).
161. 454 U.S. 170 (1981). Employers should attempt to present a mixed question of
fact and law to the reviewing court.
162. See supra notes 124-39 and accompanying text.
163. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) states:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of as-
sociation, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id
164. Id § 157.
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in such a manner as to accord labor-nexus employees the protection of
certain provisions of the NLRA and yet not permit them to be included
in the collective bargaining unit., Furthermore, supporters of total ex-
clusion may assert that since Congress has considered,165 but refused to
pass amendments to the NLRA,'6 an inference may be drawn that
Congress acquiesced to the recent total exclusion decisions in the afore-
mentioned courts of appeals.
Proponents of partial exclusion argue that inclusion in the bar-
gaining unit does not control whether an employee is accorded section
7 rights. ' 67 However, the underlying rationale for the NLRB's develop-
ment of the labor-nexus test is to "weed out" of the classification of
"employees"' 6 those workers so closely involved in labor relations
matters that to accord them rights under the NLRA would result in an
infiltration of organized labor into management's corporate struc-
ture.' 69 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has definitively ruled that
this objective has a "reasonable basis in law."'170
VII. CONCLUSION
In NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 17'
the Supreme Court sanctioned the NLRB's use of the "labor-nexus"
test to determine which employees are implicitly excluded from the col-
lective bargaining unit. However, the Court did not address the issue
of whether a confidential employee within the labor-nexus test is ex-
cluded from the NLRA in toto.
A majority of the courts of appeals confronted with the total/par-
tial exclusion issue hold that employees falling within the labor-nexus
test are totally excluded from the NLRA. Those courts reason that
when an employee is denied the basic statutory right to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of his own choosing, the accompanying
safeguards in the Act to protect that right are inapplicable. The opin-
ions of the courts of appeals indicate that absent specific statutory lan-
guage, confidential employees have interests identical to supervisors
165. See, e.g., H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977); S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978).
166. With the exception of the Health Care Amendments to the NLRA, 88 Stat. 395
(1974), numerous other measures were defeated either in the committees or on the
floor.
167. The argument is couched in the NLRB's determination of an appropriate unit
rather than the broad underlying rationale for the exclusion. See, e.g., Brief for
Petitioner at 17-24, NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership
Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
168. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
169. Whether confidential employees bargain with their employer in their own unit or
with that of other nonlabor-nexus employees, the fact remains that they are in
privity with the other side of the bargaining table.
170. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 190
(1981).
171. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
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and managerial employees, and thus are totally excluded from the
NLRA's protections.
Despite the sound reasoning behind the opinions of these courts,
the NLRB continues to maintain its position that such confidential em-
ployees are only partially excluded from the Act. The NLRB goes as
far as to blatently ignore the decisions of the circuit courts even in juris-
dictions that have specifically held in favor of total exclusion.
Thus, until the Supreme Court or Congress finally resolves the is-
sue, the scope of protection accorded confidential employees under the
NLRA remains uncertain. This uncertainty is compounded by the
NLRB's varied application of the labor-nexus test by tailoring it to the
type of NLRA violation alleged rather than the underlying rationale
for treating confidential employees differently than other employees.
As the NLRB asserts its statutory authority to fulfill the purposes of the
Act, it should pay heed to the relative bargaining positions of the par-
ties and the absurdity of requiring an employer to bargain in good faith
with a unit comprised of confidential employees who in fact are ac-
tively involved in the employer's bargaining strategy. Although a
"bright-line" rule is not imperative to the disposition of the issue, the
NLRB's failure to abide by the decisions of the majority of the courts
of appeals and employing its own varied application of the test, such a
rule may well be the only means to clarify the status of confidential
employees under the NLRA.
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